



THE LAW SOCIETY OF ALBERTA
HEARING COMMITTEE REPORT

IN THE MATTER OF THE *Legal Profession Act*,
and in the matter of a Hearing regarding the conduct
of MARK HOFFINGER, a Member of The Law Society
of Alberta

INTRODUCTION

1. On September 23, 2008, a Hearing Committee of the Law Society of Alberta (LSA) convened at the Law Society office in Calgary to inquire into the conduct of Mark Hoffinger (The Member). The Committee was comprised of Rodney Jerke, Q.C., Chair, Vivian Stevenson, Q.C., and Hugh Sommerville, Q.C., The LSA was represented by Michael Penny. The Member was present for the Hearing and was represented by Dennis McDermott, Q.C.

JURISDICTION AND PRELIMINARY MATTERS

2. Exhibits 1 through 4, consisting of the Letter of Appointment of the Hearing Committee, the Notice to Solicitor, the Notice to Attend, and the Certificate of Status of the Member, established jurisdiction of the Committee.
3. There was no objection by the Member or Counsel for the LSA regarding the constitution of the Committee.
4. The Certificate of Exercise of Discretion, Affidavit of Service of a letter and Private Hearing Application Notice on the Complainants, BH and SH, and the Affidavit of Attempted Service of a letter and Private Hearing Application Notice on FK and GV were entered as Exhibit 5. Counsel for the LSA advised that the LSA did not receive a request for a private hearing, and neither Counsel for the LSA nor the Member requested a private hearing, therefore the hearing was held in public.
5. Counsel for the Member objected to the Hearing proceeding because the Member had not been given sufficient particulars of the charge against him, and because the charge should proceed against the Member's firm rather than against the Member personally. The Hearing Committee reviewed the Citation in

light of Section 49 of the *Legal Profession Act* (The Act), and found that sufficient particulars had been provided in order to allow the Member to know the case he had to meet. The Hearing Committee found that the Citation was correctly placed against a Member of the LSA, not the Member's firm, and the task of the Hearing Committee is to ascertain if there is sufficient evidence to prove the Citation as against this Member.

CITATIONS

6. The Member faced the following Citation:
 1. IT IS ALLEGED that you failed to exercise due diligence in that you failed to communicate with B.H. and S.H. to determine whether or not their investment funds were impressed with a trust, thereby breaching the *Code of Professional Conduct*, and that such conduct is conduct deserving of sanction.

SUMMARY OF RESULT

7. In the result, on the basis of the evidence entered at the Hearing, and for the reasons set out below, the Hearing Committee found that the Citation was proven and that the Member was guilty of conduct deserving of sanction in respect of Citation 1.
8. The Hearing was adjourned to permit the Hearing Committee to make its decision on whether the Member was or was not guilty of conduct deserving of sanction, and to provide written reasons for its findings. A new date should now be arranged for continuation of the Sanction phase of the Hearing.

EVIDENCE

9. A Binder with Agreed Exhibits 1 - 13 was entered by consent of the parties and on the basis that the Member could raise questions concerning the truth of the contents of the Exhibits.
10. Exhibits 14, 15, 16, and 17 were entered by Counsel for the Member.
11. The Hearing Committee heard evidence from the Complainants (BH and SH), GV and the Member.

SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE AND FINDINGS OF FACT

A) GENERAL

12. In the Fall of 2002, BH and SH began investing in a group of companies (referred to here as I Corp). The first transaction in September of 2003 was a subscription for Series B Debentures. The Subscription Agreement contained the following clause:

“9. The Subscriber agrees to deliver to Bennett Jones LLP (in trust for the Corporation) at 4500, 855 – 2nd Street S.W., Calgary, Alberta, T2P 4K7 (Attention: Jeffrey Helper), Fax: (403) 265-7219, not later than 2:00 p.m. (Calgary time) on the business day before the Closing Date of which the Subscriber receives notice: (a) this duly completed and executed Subscription Agreement; (b) such documents as may be requested as contemplated by subsection 3(w) hereof; and (c) a certified cheque or bank draft payable to Bennett Jones LLP in trust for the Corporation for the aggregate subscription price of the Debentures subscribed for under this Subscription Agreement or payment of the same amount in such other manner as is acceptable to the Corporation.”

13. SH provided three cheques to Bennett Jones LLP and received Debentures in exchange for the investment.
14. Later in 2003, SH made a \$50,000.00 investment in a property to be developed in Calgary, and provided a cheque in the amount of \$50,000.00 payable to the Member’s firm. In the Memo portion on the face of the cheque, SH wrote “Re 20th Ave. Project”. There is no notation on the cheque stating “in trust”.
15. SH signed a document called a Term Sheet, reproduced as follows:

Term Sheet

Preconstruction mortgage
Mortgage amount \$500,000
Mortgage will be syndicated
Interest 15% per year paid quarterly with 10% pay out bonus
Term 1 year
Expected payout date July 30, 2004
Land value with 140 units is 5.8 million dollars
I Corp paid 4 million for this land
Current mortgage on land is 3.2 million
The \$500 000 mortgage will register after the 3.2 million dollars
The total mortgage will be 3.7 million dollars

Leaving 2.1 million of equity on title
Mortgage to be completed on Dec 10, 2003
All mortgage moneys to be paid to the law office of Demiantschuck Milley
Berke and Hoffinger, Suite 1200, 1015 4th St. SW
To be held in trust until mortgage has been executed

I [SH] of Calgary Alberta will invest
the sum of \$50,000.00 In the syndicated mortgage according to the
terms set above

(Exhibit 9(c))

16. SH did receive a mortgage in exchange for her \$50,000.00 investment, prepared by a lawyer at the Member's firm.
17. The third transaction is the subject matter of the Citation. In relation to this investment, SH provided two cheques dated September 4, 2004, one in the amount of \$70,000.00 and the other in the amount of \$30,000.00, each payable to the Member's firm. In the Memo portion on the face of each of the cheques, SH wrote "Re 21st Ave Mortgage". There are no notations on the cheques stating "in trust".
18. SH put her name on a Term Sheet, but did not sign it, reproduced as follows:

Term Sheet

Equity mortgage
Mortgage amount \$250,000.00
Mortgage will be syndicated
Interest 12% per year paid quarterly with 15% pay out bonus
Term 1 year
Expected payout date July 30th, 2005
This term sheet shall be construed as an agreement to enter into a profit sharing agreement when available, at the sole option of the investor.
All mortgage moneys to be paid to the law office of Demiantschuk Milley
Burke and Hoffinger Suite-1200, 1015 4th St. SW

I [SH] of Calgary Alberta will invest
the sum of \$100,000.00 In the syndicated mortgage according to the
terms set above.

(Exhibit 9(a))

19. The Term Sheet was signed on behalf of I Corp.

20. The cheques were provided to GV, who was then a Director and Officer of I Corp. The cheques were certified and then delivered to the Member. The Member placed the funds into his firm's trust account and then provided a trust cheque to I Corp in the amount of \$100,000.00, together with a letter dated September 8, 2004, which provided as follows:

"Re: General Corporate Matters

With respect to the above captioned, please find enclosed herewith our firm cheque in the amount of \$100,000.00 representing the full proceeds of the loan granted to you by BH and SH. We confirm your advice that you have provided BH and SH with a Term Sheet and other security in respect to the loan and that you will not be providing us with instructions to register any further security. We confirm your advice that these funds are fully releasable at this time based upon the foregoing."

(Exhibit 11(c))

B) EVIDENCE OF BH

21. BH testified that he and his wife attended at I Corp's offices on September 4th, 2004 and met with GV. He says that the investment was suggested and explained during this visit and that his wife signed 2 cheques totaling \$100,000 payable to the Member's firm gave them to GV. The Hs were shown a Term Sheet, and SH put her name on the sheet but did not sign it. BH did not know why.
22. BH acknowledged that this Term Sheet, unlike the 2003 Term Sheet, did not contain a provision requiring monies to be held in trust. He did not know why this was changed and testified that he did not notice a difference between the two Term Sheets at the time.
23. BH testified that the cheques were made out to the Member's firm at GV's request, and because it was the Hs' expectation that the funds would be secured by a mortgage on property. He testified that he was told by GV that the Member's firm would be acting as their lawyers and would be preparing a mortgage for them. On cross-examination, he agreed that he understood that the Member's firm was acting for I Corp, and that he expected they would act as Hs' lawyers to the extent that they would be preparing the mortgage to secure the funds.

24. BH acknowledged that he understood that this transaction, unlike the previous one, involved a property that was yet to be purchased and, therefore, he understood that there was no property against which a mortgage could be registered. He understood that the money would be used to purchase property on 21st Avenue and testified that he did not analyze the steps that would be involved in terms of when the money would be released in relation to the purchase of the property.
25. The Hs never received mortgage documents in relation to this investment. They did not have any contact with the Member or anyone at his firm until the first half of 2005. BH testified that they were told by GV that the money had been invested in a property on 22nd Avenue which had been secured by a caveat placed on the title to the property. They made inquiries and found a caveat in the name of SwCo. They made inquiries of Gowlings and were told that SwCo was a Calgary Co. and that the Member was a principal in the Company.
26. BH testified that two cheques were written because there was not enough money in one account to cover the amount of the \$100,000. BH denied that he had been told by GV that the cheques would be certified because the money was needed right away.
27. BH acknowledged that the Hs could have sought legal or financial advice with respect to their dealings with I Corp and they chose not to.
28. On cross examination, BH denied that it was his expectation that the money would simply go to I Corp and remained adamant that he expected the Member's firm to protect them with respect to the investment.

C) EVIDENCE OF SH

29. SH testified that she and her husband met with GV on Sept 4th, 2004. She believed that Mr.K was also there. She identified the Term Sheet that was presented in relation to the \$100,000 investment, and recalled that she wrote two cheques because there was not enough money in one account to cover the investment.
30. SH did not recall GV saying that the cheques would be certified or that he required that the money be in the account because I Corp needed the money right away.
31. SH understood the monies were to go to the Member's law firm and that they would then go to I Corp in exchange for the appropriate documentation. She did

not recall if GV told her what documentation she would be getting, but assumed that it would be similar to the documentation she had received previously.

D) EVIDENCE OF GV

32. GV testified that he joined I Corp in the Summer of 2003, and was involved in a number of related companies. GV had been a director and officer of I Corp, but the company no longer existed.
33. GV testified that the transaction in question was put together by his Associate, Mr.K, who had negotiated with the Hs before his involvement. He testified that he met with the Hs on September 4th to finalize the deal. GV testified that discussion about the investment was minimal because the deal had already been reached by the time he walked into the boardroom. According to GV, the idea was to buy a number of properties adjacent to the ones that I Corp already owned.
34. GV identified his signature on the Term Sheet related to the investment. He testified that no trust conditions were discussed, and said there was no mortgage here because there was nothing to mortgage. GV testified that the Term Sheet was an agreement to enter into a profit sharing agreement, when available, at the sole option of the investor which meant that the Hs could choose an equity mortgage or a profit sharing agreement.
35. GV testified that in his mind an “equity mortgage” is a mortgage to be provided in the future. He could not explain why the Term Sheet provided that all “mortgage moneys” were to be paid to the Member’s firm if there was no mortgage, but indicated that he did not draft the Term Sheet.
36. GV testified that he asked the cheques be payable to the Member’s firm, even though there were no trust conditions, because that was his usual practice and it was convenient. He agreed that the cheques could have been written directly to I Corp and that there was no reason that the cheques had to be payable to the law firm. GV testified that other than indicating that the cheque was to be payable to the Member’s firm, there was no discussion about the firm.
37. GV testified that he certified the cheques, or had someone else do so, and that he told the Hs that he was going to certify the cheques. GV testified that any time an investor brought in money he would generally certify funds because he said that a lawyer would not take a non-certified cheque. On cross-examination he agreed that if the cheque was certified, that he wouldn’t have to wait for the funds to clear before they could be paid out.
38. GV testified that once the cheques were certified he delivered them to the

Member with the Term Sheet. He did not recall his discussion with the Member at that time but thought he would have said something to the effect that the Term Sheet has no conditions, so the money could go into general revenues. He could not recall whether he discussed the nature of the deal with the Member. He thought the Term Sheet spoke for itself.

39. GV testified that the wording in the Member's letter of September 8, 2004 was that which he would have used with the Member and that he would have told him that the funds were fully releasable. He could not explain why the letter used the past tense in indicating that security had been provided when a mortgage could only have been registered once the property was purchased.
40. GV did not know what happened to the money after it was paid out to I Corp. He thought that the money basically went into general revenue and may have been used to pay bills.

E) EVIDENCE OF THE MEMBER

41. The Member confirmed that he had never met SH or BH before the morning of the Hearing.
42. He testified that SH's cheques were brought into his office after the long weekend and that he was told to put the funds in trust. He testified that GV brought in the Term Sheet the following day and that GV indicated that there were no trust conditions imposed on the funds. According to the Member, GV specifically compared a previous transaction (like the second transaction – Exhibit 9(c)) where the Member had acted and where the Term Sheet contained a trust condition that the monies be held until a mortgage was provided. He recalled those series of transactions, but indicated that he did not recall that the Hs had been investors.
43. The Member recalled that GV asked that the funds be paid out to I Corp, which he did under cover of his letter of September 8, 2004. He did not obtain from GV details of the "other security" mentioned in this correspondence. He did not write to the Hs to confirm anything with them because he did not consider them his clients and had no indication from them that they thought that he was acting for them. He made no inquiries of the Hs at all, because he felt he had no obligations to them whatsoever. He had no question in his mind about how the funds came to him or the basis upon which they came.
44. The Member recalled speaking to BH in June of 2006, but not before. He also recalled that SH left him a voicemail, but could not recall speaking to her. He

confirmed that he had received correspondence from SH in May of 2005, and that he had sent her correspondence on to I Corp. He had then responded to SH emphasizing that he acted for I Corp only and had only one client.

45. The Member testified that in his view the Term Sheet was clear and his instructions were consistent with the deal. He was not concerned about the phrase “mortgage monies payable to the firm” being inconsistent with how the deal was explained to him. He said that he asked GV about this and that he understood that this was reference to an equitable mortgage not a legal mortgage. He agreed that this type of mortgage could be registered by caveat in some circumstances. The Member testified that it was his understanding from GV that I Corp had provided a Term Sheet and “other security”. He understood that there would might be other security later on for which he would receive instructions.
46. On cross-examination, the Member conceded that he did not know the circumstances of the Hs’ transaction and that the Term Sheet did not appear to be a complete record of what the transaction was.
47. The Member had no answer for why the monies were not paid directly to I Corp, other than that it was standard practice. He knew of no valid business reason for the money flowing through his firm’s trust account.
48. The Member confirmed he has acted for I Corp in a number of projects where he holds purchaser’s deposits in trust, and if the transaction does not proceed, the trust funds are returned to the purchasers pursuant to conditions in the offer to purchase.

SUBMISSIONS OF COUNSEL

49. Counsel for the LSA submitted that while the Hs were not the Member’s clients, the Member’s duties as a lawyer could extend to such third parties. While there was no express trust condition imposed on the Member, based on the circumstances upon which the funds were provided, it was reasonable to construe that the funds were provided to the Member in trust. This gave rise to a duty upon the Member to inquire into the conditions upon which the funds were provided, and his failure to do so amounted to a breach of his ethical obligations. Counsel submitted that this case could be distinguished from *Law Society of Alberta v. Larson*, as here there was either no agreement between the Member’s client and the Hs, or the funds were not dealt with in accordance with essential terms of such an agreement.

50. Counsel for the Member argued that the fact that the Hs were gaining an advantage by way of potential profit sharing, and that the Hs were seasoned investors, did something to change the nature of the transaction. It was important that the Hs had a background in the project and access to professionals, including lawyers if they chose to use them. The Member's Counsel argued that it was worth noting that neither the Member nor the Developer profited in any improper way from the transaction. When the Member was provided with a certified cheque he was entitled to presume that the money was removed from the Hs' account and belonged to the payee. The fact that the Hs never questioned that funds had been removed from their account was important. The Member's Counsel argued that when the Hs gave GV the cheques with the Term Sheet, they cloaked him with apparent or ostensible authority to deal with the funds and cited the case of *Murphy v. Luckiw*. The Member's Counsel argued that the Member's duty to his client, I Corp, superceded any obligations he had to the Hs, and argued that as Solicitor/Client confidentiality could be compromised, it was not the Member's duty to ask questions of someone with whom he has no connection.

DECISION

51. The Hearing Committee finds that the investors, BH and SH, bona fide believed that the funds were being provided to the Member's firm, in trust, on condition that they would receive in exchange the documentation appropriate to the transaction. The Member believed that he was entitled to release the funds to his client, I Corp, without communicating with BH and SH.
52. The *Code of Professional Conduct*, Chapter 4, provides as follows:
- "R.11 The following rules govern the use of trust conditions:
- (e) If one or more of the trust conditions imposed on a lawyer is:
 - (i) unclear or ambiguous;
 - (ii) inconsistent with the terms of the clients' agreement; or
 - (iii) impractical or manifestly unfair,
- or if that lawyer is unable or unwilling to honour one or more of the trust conditions for some other reason, then that lawyer must forthwith:
- (A) return the entrusted property to the entrustor, or
 - (B) reach agreement with the entrustor to amend or clarify the trust conditions.
- (i) If a lawyer receives something which on a reasonable construction has

been forwarded to the lawyer in trust, but which is not accompanied by express trust conditions, the lawyer must proceed in accordance with paragraphs (e), (f), and (g) above, which shall apply with the necessary changes in detail.”

53. The Commentary states:

“On the other hand, a personal undertaking or trust condition accepted by a lawyer is binding on that person regardless of whether the other party involved is also a member of the legal profession.”

“Failure of an entrustor to use the words “trust condition” or “in trust” does not relieve the trustee from the obligation to perform if the action required of the trustee is clear, and it is reasonable to construe the request for the action as a trust condition by virtue of the dealings between the parties or customary practice in the area.”

“*Rule 11(i)*: Express trust wording may not always be used, particularly if the person forwarding the property is not a lawyer. The intention that the property be held in trust is often readily apparent nonetheless. If a lawyer believes that a trust was probably intended but is unsure, the lawyer has an obligation to contact the other party for clarification.”

54. Here, the funds were provided to the Member for deposit into trust. Although GV told the Member that there were no trust conditions imposed on the funds, it was appropriate, in light of the fact that the funds originated from a third party, that the Member review the Term Sheet and any other agreements related to this transaction.

55. The Hearing Committee was concerned with significant inconsistencies in the evidence.

56. The Member testified that he reviewed the Term Sheet before he released the funds, but in his letter to SH dated April 21, 2005 he stated:

“While we acknowledge receipt of loan funds from you in favour of I Corp, we state that we have never received any further details, nor had any further instructions in respect to this loan since the time of deposit of the funds (i.e., terms, conditions, security etc. of this loan). We received bare cheques (no cover letter, condition letter or term sheet) and deposited and released same to I Corp on their specific instructions to do so...”

(Exhibit 7(d))

57. Similar statements appear in other parts of the evidence.

a) In his letter to the LSA dated September 8, 2006, the Member states as follows:

“The funds received were in the form of bare cheques without cover letter, condition letter, instruction or term sheet attached.”
(Exhibit 9 – Page 1)

b) In his letter to the LSA dated October 24, 2006, the Member states as follows:

“The funds received were in the form of bare cheques without cover letter, condition letter, instruction or term sheet attached.”
(Exhibit 11 – Page 1)

“Additionally, it was confirmed that no further documentation or instruction had been received, and the recommendation from this office was to contact I Corp directly”
(Exhibit 11 – Page 2)

“The cheques received, like the correspondences from Mrs. H, refer to a property on “21st Avenue S.W.”, however. As indicated above, the writer had absolutely no knowledge of this property, nor of the possible connection between the Term Sheet and this property.”
(Exhibit 11 – Page 3)

58. The language in the September 8, 2004 letter is difficult to reconcile with the notion that the Member reviewed the Term Sheet, which mentions no security other than the mortgage, prior to releasing the funds.

“We confirm your advice that you have provided Mr. and Mrs. H with a Term Sheet and other security in respect of the loan and that you will not be providing us with instructions to register any further security.”

The letter is also inconsistent with the Member’s testimony that there would probably be other security later on for which he would receive instructions.

59. The Member has acted for I Corp in a number of projects where he holds purchasers’ deposits in trust, and returns those trust funds to the purchasers pursuant to conditions in the Offer to Purchase if the transaction does not proceed. The Member previously acted for I Corp in respect of the transaction where SH received a mortgage (although he did not recall that the Hs had been

investors on that transaction).

60. In the circumstances here, where the Member received funds from his client for deposit into his trust account, aware that the funds are derived from a third party, by the use of cheques which contain the endorsement “re: 21st Ave. Mortgage”, and considering the business background described above, it is reasonable to construe that those funds have been forwarded to the Member in trust (Code - Rule R.11(i)). As there were no express trust conditions, the Member’s duty is to forthwith reach agreement with the entrustor to amend or clarify the trust conditions. If that is not possible, the Member would have the duty to return the entrusted property.
61. The Term Sheet, particularly when read in conjunction with the cheques, and in light of the business circumstances under which the Member was operating, should have at least caused the Member to conclude that the matter was unclear, ambiguous, or potentially inconsistent with his client’s instructions. The Member as much as conceded this when he testified that he compared the Term Sheet in question with the Term Sheet of the previous transaction.
62. The question for determination is not whether a trust condition was or was not imposed, and the Hearing Committee does not make a finding in this regard. Rather, the question is whether the Member satisfied his ethical duties.
63. *Murphy v. Luckiw Holdings (1980) Ltd.* (Alta.C.A.) [1986] A.J. No. 1112 is a case which deals with liability for loss rather than the professional responsibility of a Member of the LSA and involves a promoter who secured from an unrepresented investor a cheque payable “in trust” to the promoter’s lawyer. The promoter gave the cheque to his lawyer who deposited it into his trust account and then from time to time, on instructions of the client, paid all of the funds out of his trust account. The Court held “By giving the cheque to John Murphy in the circumstances, the respondent clothed him with apparent or ostensible authority over the disposition of the funds. Such ostensible authority is a clear answer to the respondent’s claim against the appellant.” [Emphasis added]. While it is not necessary to determine here whether I Corp had ostensible authority on behalf of BH and SH, and the Hearing Committee makes no finding in this respect, the circumstances of this transaction, particularly the business background, the provisions of the Term Sheet, and the endorsement on the cheques, are significantly different from those in the *Murphy v. Luckiw* case.
64. *LSA v. Larson* is a recent disciplinary case concerning a very similar Citation to the one here. There, the Hearing Committee referred to the LSA’s decision in the Hotzel disciplinary proceedings (May 2007) which concluded “that the mere placing of funds in the lawyer’s trust account did not make the funds trust funds

and did not impose upon the lawyer the obligation to make inquiries from the third party as to the trust terms upon which the funds were provided”.

65. The Hearing Committee there went on to review the circumstances and found, at Paragraph 5, “that the funds were dealt with in accordance with the agreement signed by the investor and that while it is imprudent for a lawyer to allow a client to use his trust account as a clearing house for the raising of investment funds, the Member did not owe the non-client investor with whom he never dealt a duty to enquire as to whether the investor was making a prudent investment and had adequately protected itself in making the investment”. We agree with the conclusions of the Larson Hearing Committee, and with the analysis undertaken by that Hearing Committee of the circumstances giving rise to the placement of funds in the Member’s trust account. Using that same approach, and considering the circumstances here, the Hearing Committee has reached the conclusion that it was, at best, unclear or ambiguous as to what the terms of the agreement here were with the investor. It may be that the instructions received by the Member were inconsistent with the terms of the agreement between the Member’s client and the investors.
66. The Hearing Committee finds that the Member should have contacted SH or BH to clarify the terms upon which they understood they had provided the funds (although he would have needed I Corp.’s permission to do so), or he should have returned the cheques unused to I Corp. By failing to do so, the Member failed to act in the best interest of the Hs, who at least believed they had provided the funds on certain conditions. He acted contrary to the best interests of his client because if there were in fact conditions attached to the release of funds, the Member failed to protect his client from acting in breach of those conditions. In short, the conduct of the Member is incompatible with the best interests of the public.
67. In the result, the Hearing Committee finds that the Citation has been proven and the Member’s conduct is conduct deserving of sanction.

CONCLUDING MATTERS

68. A new date should now be arranged for continuation of the Sanction phase of the Hearing.

DATED this 15th day of January, 2009.

Rodney A. Jerke, Q.C., Bencher
Chair

Vivian Stevenson, Q.C., Bencher

Hugh Sommerville, Q.C., Bencher

DECISION ON SANCTION

On July 30, 2009 the Hearing Committee reconvened to decide the appropriate sanction. After hearing evidence and argument the Hearing Committee directed the member be reprimanded and pay actual costs of the hearing, estimated at the time to be in excess of \$3,700.00. The Hearing Committee will be providing written reasons for its decisions. The reasons will be published when released.